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The Inclusion of General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance  
Abstract 
We examine whether the inclusion of general counsel in top management is associated with a 
firm’s tax avoidance. We find that firms with general counsel as part of the top management 
team have lower GAAP effective tax rate, more uncertain tax positions, a higher likelihood of 
engaging in tax shelter activities, and more tax haven countries in which the firm reports a 
significant subsidiary, relative to firms without a general counsel in top management. In 
addition, we find that among firms with general counsel in top management, tax avoidance is 
greater when (1) the general counsel has tax-related expertise, (2) the firm hires an external 
auditor with tax expertise or purchases more tax services from its external auditor, and (3) the 
CEO has more power over the general counsel.  
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The Inclusion of General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance  
 
 “Positioned as an officer within a corporation, a general counsel who is an influential 
member of its senior management cohort may help shape the corporation’s activities and 
policies in directions that are highly desirable, exercising influence that may extend beyond 
the bare bones of ensuring legal compliance. A general counsel also may be uniquely well 
positioned to champion a transformation of the organizational culture that shapes how the 
corporation addresses its relationship with law and regulation.” (DeMott 2005, 955-956) 
 
1. Introduction 
The general counsel, who is the chief attorney for a corporation, has the important 
role of overseeing and advising on legal issues within the firm, including tax compliance. As 
the business environment gets more complex and litigious, members of senior management 
have come to expect general counsel to be involved in high-level strategic decisions as an 
adviser with intimate knowledge of the corporation and its business who is able to contribute 
business insights as well as legal skill (DeMott 2005). Bagley (2008, 383) argues that top 
management teams that “include the general counsel have a higher degree of legal astuteness 
than those that do not.” The heightened legal astuteness is not surprising because when the 
general counsel is part of top management, she is more likely to be more involved in business 
strategies and be in a better position to identify legal opportunities and threats. To date, there 
is little research on how the composition of top management relates to important firm 
decisions that have legal implications (e.g., Kwak et al. 2012; Hopkins et al. 2015). We 
extend this line of research by examining whether the inclusion of general counsel in top 
management is related to corporate tax avoidance. 
While it seems obvious that the general counsel’s inclusion in top management 
increases the legal astuteness of the top management team, it is unclear how the heightened 
astuteness translates into corporate tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is determined by many 
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factors such as tax rates, the probability of detection and punishment, penalties, risk-aversion 
and civic duty. To maximize profits for shareholders, the firm is expected to go after 
opportunities that reduce tax liabilities, as long as the expected incremental benefits exceed 
the incremental cost (Slemrod 2004).  Given her legal expertise and the potential legal 
complexities surrounding tax decisions, the general counsel is likely to be instrumental in 
assessing important aspects of these decisions. We expect the general counsel to make use of 
her expertise, especially if she is part of the top management team, to facilitate tax planning.  
First, the general counsel’s involvement in top management strategy meetings and 
discussions gives her greater insights into the firm’s business transactions. This intimate 
knowledge of the corporation and its business, coupled with the general counsel’s legal skills, 
means that the general counsel can better advise top management on applicable regulations, 
including tax regulations, and can help the firm to develop and implement more complex and 
sophisticated tax policies that reduce explicit taxes. 1  Second, by being part of top 
management, the general counsel is more sensitive to the needs of the top management and 
shareholders in terms of maximizing after-tax income. She might also be intrinsically 
motivated to help the firm save on taxes, given the status and expectations that come with 
being part of top management. As a result, top management is more legally astute as to how 
to engage in tax planning proactively or at the minimum, more likely to factor in tax (and 
other regulatory) considerations when developing various business strategies.  
Third, given that uncertainty about a firm’s tax liability can diminish the firm’s tax 
planning ability (Gallemore and Labro 2014), a general counsel in top management can 
facilitate tax avoidance by reducing such uncertainty. For instance, top management is likely 
                                                 
1 Consistent with Bagley (2008), we make the reasonable assumption that on average, top management that 
includes the general counsel are more legally astute. In terms of tax knowledge, the general counsel might 
herself be a tax expert, might be advised by tax experts within the office of the general counsel or from the tax 
department, and/or might be advised by external counsels. It is also reasonable to assume that a general counsel 
who is inclined to help the firm minimize taxes would enhance the tax capabilities and competence of the legal 
department or even hire auditors with tax-specific industry experience to help in tax planning. 
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to be more confident in and comfortable with proceeding with an uncertain tax position when 
the team includes a general counsel who advocates the controversial tax strategy and provide 
assurance that the tax authorities would subsequently consider the strategy sustainable. The 
general counsel (and her team of internal counsels) may be in a better position to defend the 
firm’s tax strategies if challenged by IRS, and her representation in the tax courts may 
increase the likelihood of the firm successfully defending certain tax strategies.  
Notwithstanding the above arguments, the general counsel can set a conservative tone 
at the top and promote among the top management team a more cautious approach to the 
firm’s business strategies. Because the general counsel is expected to practice preventive law 
(DeMott 2005) and to intervene early and prevent the company from being involved in 
litigation (Brown 2003), it seems conceivable that a general counsel who is part of top 
management would influence the management team to not proceed with risky tax strategies, 
especially those that push the envelope of present tax law. Consistent with corporate tax 
avoidance being risky is the evidence presented in Kim et al. (2011) that more aggressive 
corporate tax avoidance is associated with a higher stock price crash risk. Aggressive tax 
strategies also have a greater likelihood of being challenged by the IRS and can subject the 
firm to significant legal and reputational costs. The general counsel could then be blamed for 
her failure to mitigate the firm’s legal and compliance risks. This alternative view suggests 
that there would be lower tax avoidance for firms with a general counsel in top management. 
Whether the inclusion of the general counsel in top management is associated with the 
extent of a firm’s tax avoidance is ultimately an empirical question. To test this link, we 
identify firms with a general counsel in top management using data from Compustat 
ExecuComp, which covers the S&P1500 firms. Given that there is no single universally 
accepted measure of tax avoidance and each measure has its limitation, we use various 
measures that capture a broad spectrum of tax avoidance activities—(1) GAAP effective tax 
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rate, (2) uncertain tax positions which we operationalize using predicted unrecognized tax 
benefits in Lisowsky et al. (2013), (3) likelihood of engaging in tax shelter activities, which 
we operationalize using the tax shelter prediction score in Wilson (2009), and (4) the number 
of tax haven countries in which the firm reports a significant subsidiary.  
Firms that elevate the general counsel to top management are likely to be different in 
several observable dimensions as compared to those that do not. Hence, these observable 
factors that lead to the general counsel being part of top management could potentially be the 
same factors that are correlated with tax avoidance and results in an omitted correlated 
variable problem. We mitigate this potential endogeneity problem using propensity score 
matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) in which we match treatment and control firms based 
on observable characteristics that result in the general counsel being part of top management. 
Using this matching methodology and controlling for other documented factors that affect tax 
avoidance, we find that firms with general counsel as part of the top management team have 
lower effective tax rate, more uncertain tax positions, a higher likelihood of engaging in tax 
shelter activities, and more tax haven countries in which the firm reports a significant 
subsidiary, relative to firms without a general counsel in top management. This result is 
robust to using the full unmatched sample, a difference-in-differences analysis, and 
controlling for CEO and CFO compensation incentives. In addition, we follow prior literature 
(e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011) and 
examine whether individual general counsels in top management impose their personal 
influence over tax avoidance as they move to another firm. We document a significant 
general counsel (in top management) individual fixed effect, over and above firm, CEO and 
CFO fixed effect. Overall, our finding suggests that a general counsel in top management can 
have a significant influence on a firm’s tax decisions by using her legal expertise and insights 
acquired from being part of the top management team to facilitate tax planning in the firm. 
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To corroborate our main result and to provide more direct evidence on the role of the 
general counsel in tax avoidance, we examine some cross-sectional variations on the sample 
of firms with a general counsel in top management. First, we examine the expertise of the 
general counsel. We predict that if the general counsel has tax expertise or background, she 
should be able to better advise top management on complex tax issues and regulations, and to 
help the firm develop more sophisticated tax strategies that can result in substantial tax 
savings for the firm. Consistent with our expectation, we find that among firms with general 
counsel in top management, tax avoidance is even greater when the general counsel has tax 
expertise or expertise in related areas such as accounting or finance. Second, we examine 
whether a general counsel in top management can better facilitate tax planning when the firm 
hires an external auditor with tax (or overall) expertise or purchases more non-audit tax 
services from its external auditor. We find that among firms with general counsel in top 
management, tax avoidance is positively associated with the presence of an external auditor 
with tax (or overall) expertise and the magnitude of non-audit tax services fees paid to its 
external auditor. Finally, we predict that when the CEO is relatively more powerful than the 
general counsel in the top management team, she is better able to exert more influence on the 
general counsel to pursue more tax saving strategies. Consistent with our prediction, we find 
that among firms with general counsel in top management, tax avoidance is even greater 
when the CEO is relatively more powerful than the general counsel in the top management 
team. Overall, these results strengthen our inferences that the general counsel in top 
management plays an important role in influencing the firm’s tax decisions.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, Dyreng et al. (2010) 
examine whether individual executives such as the CEO and CFO have an effect on their 
firms’ tax avoidance by tracking the movement of these executives across firms during the 
period from 1992 to 2006. Their results indicate that individual executives play a significant 
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role in determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake, incremental to firm 
characteristics. Dyreng et al. (2010) also find that executives’ backgrounds cannot explain 
much of the variation in tax avoidance across executives. Our paper extends their study and 
focuses on how the inclusion of the general counsel in top management is associated with a 
firm’s tax avoidance, and we find that the presence of the general counsel in top management 
can influence tax decisions. 
Second, our paper adds to the literature on the economic consequences of 
management composition that includes the general counsel. Kwak et al. (2012) find that firms 
with a general counsel in top management are more likely to issue forecasts, particularly bad 
news forecasts, than are other firms. Further, these forecasts are less optimistic and more 
accurate than those that are issued by others. Hopkins et al. (2015) find that firms with a 
general counsel in top management have lower accounting quality and engage in more 
earnings management than firms without. Given the importance and responsibility of the 
general counsel in ensuring tax compliance, a natural extension of this literature is to 
investigate how this management composition relates to tax avoidance, especially since there 
is significant tension in the hypothesis concerning this relation. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related research and 
develop the hypotheses in the next section. We present the sample selection, measures of tax 
avoidance and the empirical models used in the study in section three and report the main 
empirical analyses in section four. We discuss further analyses in section five, and provide 
our conclusions in the final section. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1. The inclusion of general counsel in top management and the role of general counsel 
The role of general counsel in U.S. corporations has evolved over time (Liggio 1997; 
DeMott 2005). As the firm’s top legal officer, the general counsel is responsible for advising 
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the board of directors and senior management on regulatory compliances, legal matters and 
the firm’s litigation risk. They also help facilitate transactions such as mergers and 
acquisitions and the patenting of intellectual property. According to Coffee (2003), the 
general counsel acts as the firm’s gatekeeper, monitoring the accuracy of corporate 
disclosures and representing the shareholder and public. The general counsel also serves as an 
internal corporate governance mechanism to monitor managers’ unusual or fraudulent 
behavior (Jagolinzer et al. 2011; Kwak et al. 2012). 
As the business environment gets more complex and litigious, members of senior 
management have come to expect the general counsel to be involved in high-level strategic 
decisions as an adviser with intimate knowledge of the corporation and its business who is 
able to contribute business insights as well as legal skill (DeMott 2005). An interview with 
Bruce Sewall, previous general counsel of Intel (and current general counsel of Apple), 
provides useful insights into the diverse roles of general counsel beyond legal function.2 In 
this interview, he stated that the general counsel is an important partner in the business and 
the key to doing a successful job as a general counsel is “the ability to be a businessperson” 
when managing different teams within the firm. He also highlighted that the general counsel 
has a large number of issues to deal with but is required not to go as deep into each. Sewell 
also discussed about the need to enlist the services of outside counsel in some instances. 
Heineman (2010) puts forward the notion that the general counsel acts as “lawyer-
statesman", the essence of which includes moving beyond questions of “is it legal?” to “is it 
right?” 3 In discussing the role of the general counsel, he states that the general counsel 
should develop the firm’s essential position on corporate citizenship for review by 
stakeholders. He thinks corporate citizenship includes three elements: (1) sustained economic 
                                                 
2 http://whoswholegal.com/news/counselinterviews/article/12581/california-corporate-counsel-bruce-sewell/ 
3 According to Heineman (2010), the lawyer‐statesman role involves not just dealing with past problems, but 
charting future courses; not just playing defense, but playing offense; not just providing legal advice, broadly 
defined, but being part of the business team and offering business advice. It means being both a partner to 
business leadership but ultimately the guardian of the company. 
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performance, which provides benefits to stakeholders across society, (2) robust adherence to 
the spirit and the letter of the laws and regulations designed to advance social goods, and (3) 
adherence to global ethical standards and public policy positions that are in the enlightened 
self-interest of the firm, but fairly balance private concerns with the public interest.  
Consistent with the general counsel’s increasing role and importance as a member of 
the top management team, many general counsels hold the title of vice president and have a 
close relationship with the CEO and other members of top management (Duggin 2006). In 
addition, the general counsel is often among the highest paid positions in the company. As 
reported by Equilar’s 2013 Executive Compensation Survey, the median total compensation 
for general counsels at Fortune 1000 companies was $1,613,654. In our sample, 40.6 percent 
of firms have the general counsel among its highest paid executives with an average 
compensation of $1,432,640, approximately 27.1 percent of the CEO's remuneration. 
Positioned as an important member of top management team, the general counsel now wields 
considerable influence and power within the organizational structure (Duggin 2006).4 
Recent studies have begun to explore how the presence of a general counsel in the top 
echelon of management influences the firm’s disclosure and financial reporting policies. For 
instance, Bamber et al. (2010) test the influence of individual executives on a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure policy and find that top managers, including the general counsel, exert 
economically significant individual-specific influence over five attributes of management 
earnings forecasts: forecast frequency, forecast precision, news conveyed by the forecast, and 
                                                 
4 The webpage of Ford Motor Company provides a good illustration of the increasingly expanded roles of the 
general counsel among U.S. corporations today. It states that “At Ford Motor Company, our Office of the 
General Counsel, working together with outside counsel, operates as a team to deliver world class legal, tax, 
and audit services to client groups throughout the Company. We are committed to working with the Company's 
business operations to (i) manage legal risk by anticipating exposure, implementing or expanding preventive 
measures to ensure compliance and avoid costs, increasing employee awareness, and improving Company 
decision-making, (ii) defend the Company's reputation and products in litigation and before government 
agencies, (iii) pursue legal and tax reform initiatives, (iv) provide strategic advice to generate business 
opportunities and provide solutions that increase shareholder value, (v) Manage and advance the Company's 




the bias in and accuracy of the forecasts. Kwak et al. (2012) find that firms with general 
counsel in top management issue more management earnings forecasts that are more accurate 
and less optimistic. Their results are consistent with the general counsel being an important 
internal advisory and governing mechanism in improving voluntary disclosure. On the other 
hand, Hopkins et al. (2015) find that firms with general counsel in top management have 
lower accounting quality and engage in more earnings management, suggesting that having 
the general counsel on the top management team facilitates aggressive financial reporting 
behavior on the firm’s part. Hence, there appears to be mixed evidence as to the effect of 
having the general counsel in top management on the aggressiveness and/or quality of firms’ 
disclosures.  
2.2. The inclusion of general counsel in top management and tax avoidance 
While Bagley (2008, 383) argues that top management teams that “include the general 
counsel have a higher degree of legal astuteness than those that do not”, it is unclear how the 
heightened astuteness translates into corporate tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is determined by 
many factors such as tax rates, the probability of detection and punishment, penalties, risk-
aversion and civic duty. To maximize profits for shareholders, the firm is expected to go after 
opportunities that reduce tax liabilities, as long as the expected incremental benefits exceed 
the incremental cost (Slemrod 2004). Given the potential legal complexities surrounding tax 
decisions, we expect the general counsel to make use of her legal expertise, especially if she 
is part of the top management team, to influence the tax policies of the company in such a 
manner so as to maximize shareholders’ value. A general counsel in top management can 
facilitate tax planning in several ways. 
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First, the general counsel’s involvement in top management strategy meetings and 
discussions gives her greater insights into the firm’s business transactions.5 This intimate 
knowledge of the corporation and its business, coupled with the general counsel’s legal skills, 
means that the general counsel can better advise top management on applicable regulations, 
including tax regulations, and help the firm to develop and implement more complex and 
sophisticated tax policies that can substantially reduce explicit taxes. Note that the general 
counsel needs only broad legal subject matter expertise and it is not necessary that she has to 
be a tax attorney or has the tax expertise to influence the firm’s tax behavior. 6 The general 
counsel is likely to be advised by her team of in-house attorneys whose expertise largely 
reflects the demands of the firm. See, for example, the organization chart of General Electric 
in which the tax department reports to the general counsel.7 It is also reasonable to assume 
that a general counsel who is inclined to help the firm minimize taxes would enhance the tax 
capabilities and/or competence of the legal department or even hire auditors with tax-specific 
industry experience to help in tax planning.8  
                                                 
5 Consistent with this reasoning, Heineman (2010, 13) notes, “a strong inside legal team—that is part of the 
company culture, understands its rhythms and personality, is in the daily flow of business—is far more 
effective, and far more cost effective, than outside counsel can possibly be in helping the company achieve 
both high performance and high integrity.” This suggests that a general counsel who is part of top management 
will have greater insights into the thinking and philosophy of the top management team. 
6 The fact that the general counsel heads a legal department of individuals with different types of expertise, 
works with external experts, and coordinate with many different departments highlights that the general 
counsel need not be an expert in any or all fields. What is important is for the general counsel to integrate the 
different pieces of information made available to him and advises the top management accordingly. Naturally, 
a legal background helps in collecting and integrating information related to laws and regulations. Consistent 
with this reasoning, Dyreng et al. (2010) find that CEOs, who are almost never a tax expert, impose significant 
individual influence over tax avoidance activities. 
7 The organization chart is available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/articles/Heineman-CC-
In-the-Beginning-April06.pdf. Furthermore, on the website of the Office of the General Counsel at Ford Motor 
Company, tax is listed as one of the areas under the responsibility of the Office. The website also states that the 
tax team “works in an environment with other legal professionals whose training supports analytic thinking, 
creative problem solving and client orientation. The tax team is able to deliver solid and thoughtful tax 
planning that is integral to the company”. (Source: https://corporate.ford.com/careers/departments/office-of-
the-general-counsel.html). Finally, an advertisement for general counsel posted by Intel Corporation states that 
the general counsel would, among others, “advises officials on tax matters, government regulations, contract 
negotiation, federal and state tax legislation and/or legal rights” (Source: 
http://www.goinhouse.com/jobs/27966-tax-counsel-at-intel). 
8 An interesting article titled “The most influential person in the tax world” in NYU law magazine illustrates 
this point (http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/magazine/2013/the-most-influential-person-in-the-tax-world/).  In 1987, 
Jack Welch, the legendary chief executive of General Electric, hired Ben Heineman as the general counsel to 
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Second, by being part of top management, the general counsel is more sensitive to the 
needs of the top management and shareholders in terms of maximizing after-tax income. She 
might also be intrinsically motivated to help the firm save on taxes, given the status and 
expectations that come with being part of the top management. As a result, the top 
management becomes more legally astute as to how to engage in tax planning proactively or 
at the minimum, more likely to factor in tax (and other regulatory) considerations when 
developing various business strategies. According to Bagley (2008), legally astute 
management teams include legal constraints and opportunities at each stage of strategy 
formulation and execution. They also take a proactive approach to regulation, both to avoid 
more onerous regulation and to take advantage of the opportunities from regulation and 
deregulation. Consequently, legally astute management teams are better able to incorporate 
tax planning techniques into their overall business strategy, which leads to an enhanced 
ability to generate after-tax income. The general counsel may even be pressured by the other 
members of top management team to enhance firm value through active tax planning.   
Third, according to Gallemore and Labro (2014), uncertainty about a firm’s tax 
liability can diminish the firm’s tax planning ability, since tax opportunities may not be 
visible, there may be substantial doubts about the payoffs of particular tax avoidance 
opportunities, and forecasting over the wide range of potential tax outcomes may be difficult. 
Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989)’s model predicts that when firms operate in an environment 
with high uncertainty about the tax liability, firms will pay a higher amount of taxes to reduce 
the probability that a fine will be assessed. McGuire et al. (2012b) empirically find that firms 
characterized by high operating uncertainty are less likely to engage in tax shelters. A general 
counsel in top management can aid in more effective tax avoidance by reducing uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                                        
develop a significant in-house legal department. Heineman, who is a constitutional lawyer, in turn, hired John 
Samuels as vice president and senior tax counsel at General Electric. Samuels eventually built up the firm’s 
global tax operation as one of the most aggressive tax operations in the world, with about 1,200 tax experts in 
44 countries. According to Samuels, General Electric has obligations to shareholders to take advantage of the 
tax incentives that governments provide. 
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in tax planning. For instance, top management is likely to be more confident in and 
comfortable with proceeding with an uncertain tax positions when the team includes a 
general counsel who advocates the controversial tax strategy and provides assurance that the 
tax authorities would subsequently consider the strategy sustainable. Given her intimate 
knowledge of the business and the circumstances surrounding the tax strategies, the general 
counsel (and her team of internal counsels) may be in a better position to defend the firm’s 
tax strategies if challenged by IRS, and her representation in the tax courts may increase the 
likelihood of the firm successfully defending certain tax strategies.9  
Notwithstanding the above arguments, the general counsel can set a conservative tone 
at the top and promote among the top management team a more cautious approach to the 
firm’s business strategies, including tax planning. The general counsel is expected to practice 
preventive law by proactively assisting management with the assessment of legal risks and in 
making decisions on how to handle them (DeMott 2005). By doing so, the general counsel 
helps to “intervene early and prevent the company from being involved in litigation” (Brown 
2003).10 Following a series of corporate failures and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002, the general counsel is now expected to assume greater legal and professional 
responsibilities to ensure that financial goals of the firm are lawfully attained. For instance, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act obligates the general counsel to take certain mandatory measures to 
prevent corporate malfeasance and to report allegations of corporate misconduct “up the 
ladder”.11 It is conceivable that a conservative general counsel in top management would 
influence top management not to proceed with uncertain or controversial tax strategies, 
                                                 
9 In a recent court case in 2013, Robert Grey, who is the general counsel and part of top management of PPL 
Corporation, was credited with the success of PPL’s corporation in convincing the Supreme Court to overturn a 
decision banning its use of foreign tax credits against the UK “windfall tax” law. 
10 Consistent with the general counsel exerting a cautious, conservative influence on the firm, Jagolinzer et al. 
(2011) find that when the general counsel’s approval is required for insider trades, executives are constrained 
from using their private information to make profitable insider trading. 
11 Following the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the fiduciary and professional responsibilities of the general counsel are 
increasingly codified and explicit. For example, section 307 of the SOX Act requires “an attorney to report 




especially those that push the envelope of tax laws. This is because in the event that the tax 
strategies are being challenged by the IRS or are considered to be non-tax-compliant, the firm 
can suffer significant legal and reputational costs and the general counsel could be blamed for 
her failure to mitigate the firm’s legal and compliance risks. Presumably, the blame will be 
greater if the general counsel is part of the top management. Under this view, we expect a 
negative association between the presence of a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance. 
Given the opposing views on whether having a general counsel in top management 
affects a firm’s tax policies, we formulate our first hypothesis in the null form as follows:12  
Hypothesis 1:  Firms with a general counsel in top management exhibit no different tax 
avoidance compared to firms without a general counsel in top management. 
As an aside, after establishing the base (i.e., on average) result for the above hypothesis, we 
develop further hypotheses later in the paper to enrich the analyses of the relation between 
general counsel in top management and tax avoidance.  
 
3.  Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample of firms with a general counsel in top management 
 We construct our initial sample to identify firms with a general counsel in top 
management from Compustat ExecuComp for the sample period 1996-2012. ExecuComp 
collects the annual compensation data of the five highest-paid executives from the proxy 
statements reported by the S&P1500 firms. In our sample, 93.4% (97.4%) of the firms report 
the compensation details of at least five (four) executives. Following Kwak et al. (2012) and 
                                                 
12  Our paper does not take a position as to whether having a general counsel who is a “facilitator” or 
“gatekeeper” of tax avoidance increases firm value because the firm value outcome hinges on how tax 
avoidance is associated with firm value. For example, if tax avoidance increases firm value and having a 
general counsel in top management is associated with greater tax avoidance, then one might expect this 
composition of top management to increase firm value. The focus of our paper is to establish the link between 
general counsel in top management and tax avoidance. 
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Hopkins et al. (2015), we examine the annual title (titleann) of every executive reported by 
ExecuComp for the presence of general counsel in top management. For the purposes of our 
study, we consider the following titles on ExecuComp to be a general counsel: general 
counsel, chief counsel, corporate counsel, senior counsel, chief legal counsel, chief legal 
officer, chief legal executive, chief counsel, vice president of law, vice president of legal 
affairs, etc. In our initial sample, 40.6% of firm-year observations report the presence of a 
general counsel in top management (GC = 1).  This reported incidence of a general counsel in 
top management is slightly lower than the 43.0% reported incidence documented in Kwak et 
al. (2012). The difference is likely due to missing annual titles in the earlier years of the 
sample, which Kwak et al. (2012) supplement by hand-collecting annual titles from 10-Ks 
and other sources. When we examine the incidence of general counsel in top management in 
the later years of the sample after fiscal year 2000, the incidence is 42.1%, which is very 
similar to what is reported in Kwak et al. (2012). 13  We then merge this sample with 
Compustat and CRSP to obtain variables necessary to compute the variables for the 
propensity score matching procedure and the control variables in the main analyses. We 
exclude firms in financial (2-digit SICs between 60 and 69) and utility (2-digit SICs of 49) 
industries because firms in regulated industries have different tax and financial reporting 
incentives from other firms. We also winsorize each continuous variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. Our full sample for the propensity score matching 
procedure yields 17,137 firm-year observations. 
3.2 Propensity score matching procedure 
 Firms with the general counsel as part of top management are likely to be different in 
several observable dimensions as compared to those that do not. Hence, these observable 
factors that lead to the general counsel being part of top management could potentially be the 
                                                 
13 Hopkins et al. (2015) report a lower incidence of a general counsel in top management of 36.9%. 
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same factors (opportunity and incentives) that are correlated with tax avoidance and results in 
an omitted correlated variable problem. For example, firms with more complex operations 
may be more likely to have the general counsel as part of top management, and these 
complex operations may also provide the firm with more opportunities to avoid tax. To 
mitigate potential endogeneity associated with the presence of the general counsel in top 
management, we form a matched sample of observations with general counsel in top 
management and those without using propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). Propensity score matching is a methodology used to find a group of comparable 
treatment (in this case, firms with general counsel in top management) and control 
observations to mitigate the effect of selection bias, or differences in observable 
characteristics between treatment and control samples, in observational causal studies. By 
matching treatment and control firms on these observable characteristics, any difference in 
outcome can, in the absence of hidden bias, be attributed to the difference in treatment. This 
research design has gained increased acceptance in the recent accounting literature (e.g., 
Armstrong et al. 2010; Chan et al. 2012, 2015; Kwak et al. 2012).  
 To implement this research design, we estimate a logit model where we regress an 
indicator variable that equals one (zero) for observations with (without) general counsel in 
top management (GC) on a set of firm characteristics that predicts the general counsel’s 
inclusion in top management following the prediction model used by Kwak et al. (2012), and 
we also include some additional variables to improve the explanatory power of the model. 
Specifically, we include a set of variables that predict the probability of security class action 
lawsuits (TRADVOL, BETA, RET, MINRET, RETSKEW, RETVOL and INDLITIG) following 
the litigation model developed by Rogers and Stocken (2005). We also include LAWSUIT 
because firms with historical lawsuits or are currently being sued may be more likely to 
elevate the general counsel’s in-house status. We include PCTGC because the industry 
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practice of having general counsel in top management may influence the firm’s decision to 
have a general counsel in top management. We also include FIRMAGE because more 
established firms are likely to have attained the size and scope of operations that justify 
substantial internal legal departments and hence general counsels of these firms are more 
likely to be part of top management. We include NUMEXEC because the likelihood of having 
a general counsel in top management is higher when more executives are named in the annual 
proxy statement. We include several governance characteristics that may influence firm’s 
decision to have the general counsel in top management (CEOCHAIR, CEOTENURE and 
IOHOLD). We include TURNOVER because recent CEO and/or CFO turnover may affect 
firm’s inclination to place the general counsel in top management. We include RD, INTANG, 
FI and NSEG because firms in research and development intensive industries, firms with 
intangible assets and firms with foreign and complex operations may require specific legal 
expertise of having the general counsel in top management. Finally, we include ROA, LEV, 
SIZE, MB, industry and year indicator variables as proxies for firm performance, capital 
structure, industry-specific and time-specific factors that may affect a firm’s decision to place 
a general counsel in top management. The detailed definition of these variables is outlined in 
the Appendix. 
 Table 1 Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the 17,137 firm-year 
observations with available data for the propensity score matching and control variables in 
the main regression. As reported in this panel, firms with general counsel in top management 
(GC = 1) differ significantly in many observable dimensions as compared to those without 
(GC = 0). Table 1 Panel B provides the results of the logit regression to perform the 
propensity score matching. To determine the accuracy of the propensity score model in 
discriminating between observations with general counsel in top management and those 
without, we assess the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve 
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(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). As reported in this table, the area under ROC curve is 0.7056, 
which is above the acceptable threshold of 0.7 as suggested by DeFond et al. (2015), and thus 
indicates that the propensity score model has reasonable explanatory power. Based on the 
results of this model, we compute the propensity score for each observation and then match 
each treatment observation to a control observation with the closest propensity score without 
replacement. To ensure a reasonable match and to minimize the observable difference 
between the treatment and control sample, we require a caliper of 0.01 and a common support. 
Based on this procedure, we obtain 5,710 pairs of treatment and control sample. 
 To determine whether the propensity score matching achieves covariate balance, we 
assess whether the treatment and control sample still exhibits significant difference in the 
various observable dimensions examined earlier. Panel C provides the descriptive statistics of 
the 11,420 firm-year observations identified by propensity score matching. As reported in this 
table, there is no significant difference between the treatment and control sample in any 
variable. This suggests that our matching procedure achieves a covariate balance, and we will 
use this propensity score matched sample for our main empirical tests. 
3.3 Measures of tax avoidance 
Consistent with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), we view tax avoidance as 
encompassing a spectrum of tax planning activities with outcomes that range from certain to 
uncertain, where uncertain tax positions are those that are supported by a relatively weak set 
of facts and are, thus, less likely to be sustained upon audit. Given that our research question 
is about whether general counsel in top management are associated with greater tax 
avoidance, we are interested in measures that capture a broad spectrum of tax avoidance 
activities and are likely to capture substantial tax savings in the firm—(1) effective tax rate 
(ETR), (2) the amount of uncertain tax positions (PRED_UTB), (3) the likelihood of engaging 
in tax shelter activities (SHELTER), and (4) the number of distinct tax haven countries in 
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which the firm has significant operations (NTAXHAVEN). Given that each of the above tax 
measure has its own limitations, the use of four different measures helps triangulate our 
inferences and increase the robustness of our results. 
The first measure, ETR reflects the traditional GAAP effective tax rate, and is defined 
as total tax expense divided by pretax book income. ETR reflects any tax avoidance activities 
(but not tax deferral strategies) that directly affect net income and thus encompasses a broad 
range of tax planning activities. An ETR lower than the statutory tax rates suggests that firm 
have income included in book income that will never be recorded in taxable income (e.g., 
municipal bond interest, tax credits and permanently reinvested earnings). ETR is commonly 
used as a measure of a firm’s tax burden (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; 
Armstrong et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012a), and we utilize this measure as a general proxy 
for tax avoidance. We multiply this measure by minus 1 so that all measures utilized in this 
study are increasing in tax avoidance for ease of interpretation. 
The second measure is the predicted unrecognized tax benefits (PRED_UTB) based 
on Lisowsky et al. (2013), which captures the amount of income taxes associated with 
uncertain tax positions. We use this measure because we conjecture earlier that a general 
counsel in top management can reduce uncertainty in tax planning (thus facilitating tax 
avoidance) by better advocating and defending the firm’s uncertain tax positions. The 
measure is computed as follows:  
PRED_UTB  = 0.0089  SIZE – 0.0010  PP&E + 0.0036  R&D + 0.0011  M&A  
+ 0.0008  FOR_SALE + 0.0052  CRTY + 0.0010  TAXHAVEN  
+ 0.0016  EQEARN + 0.0004  MEZZFIN + 0.0006  AOCI  
+ 0.0036  DEFREV + 0.0103  STKCOMP + 0.0016  NOL  
– 0.0003  NEXUS, 
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where SIZE is the log of total assets, PP&E is the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total assets, R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by lagged total 
assets, M&A is an indicator variable equals one if the firm engaged in an M&A transaction as 
the acquirer in the current year, zero otherwise, FOR_SALE is the percentage of foreign sales, 
CRTY is the natural log of the number of distinct countries (other than the U.S.) in which the 
firm reports a significant subsidiary per 10-K Schedule 21 of the current year, TAXHAVEN is 
an indicator equals one if firm reports in 10-K Schedule 21 a tax haven subsidiary, zero 
otherwise, EQEARN is the ratio of the absolute value of equity in earnings, divided by the 
absolute value of income before extraordinary items, MEZZFIN is the ratio of convertible 
debt and preferred stock scaled by total assets, AOCI is the ratio of the absolute value of 
accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by total assets, DEFREV is an indicator 
equals one if deferred revenue is non-zero, zero otherwise, STKCOMP is an indicator equals 
one if stock compensation expense is non-zero, zero otherwise, NOL is an indicator equals 
one if net operating loss carry-forward is non-zero, zero otherwise, NEXUS is an indicator 
equals one if SIC code is in the range (4000-4899) and (5000-5999), zero otherwise.14 
 For our third measure, we use the tax shelter prediction score (SHELTER) developed 
by Wilson (2009) because tax shelter activities reflect the general counsel’s ability in helping 
the firm develop more complex and sophisticated tax strategies that can substantially reduce 
tax burden. Note that the use of tax shelters does not necessarily imply that the firm engages 
in some form of illegal activity. As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, footnote 39) note, “A 
problem with tax shelters is that it is almost always ambiguous whether the transaction is 
                                                 
14 We use Lisowsky et al.’s (2013) model of predicted UTB instead of Rego and Wilson’s (2012) model of 
predicted UTB because the former base their model on the results of a survey of tax practitioners’ view of the 
most complex and uncertain areas of tax law (Burton and Karlinsky 2011). On the other hand, the Rego and 
Wilson (2012) model is largely based on Gupta and Newberry (1997), a paper that measures the determinants 
of ETRs.  In addition, Lisowsky et al. (2013) use a much larger and diverse sample than Rego and Wilson 
(2012) (19,271 firm-years from the S&P 1500 versus 2,162 firm-years from the S&P500 and S&P400). Finally, 
the Lisowsky et al. (2013) model explains 55% of the nondiscretionary tax factors associated with the UTB, 
while the Rego and Wilson (2012) model explains 22%.  
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permissible or not.” Further, the IRS recognizes tax planning via tax shelters as legitimate as 
long as they exhibit ‘economic substance’ or a ‘business purpose’. The measure is computed 
as follows: 
SHELTER  = -4.30 + 6.63  BTD - 1.72  LEV + 0.66  SIZE + 2.26  ROA   
+ 1.62  FI + 1.56  R&D,  
where BTD refers to book income less taxable income scaled by lagged total assets, LEV 
refers to long term debt divided by total assets, SIZE refers to the log of total assets, ROA 
refers to pre-tax earnings divided by total assets, FI refers to an indicator variable equals one 
for firm observations reporting foreign income, zero otherwise, and R&D refers to the 
research and development expenditure divided by lagged total assets.15 
Finally, our last measure is the number of distinct tax haven countries in which the 
firm has significant operations because firms that have material operations in at least one tax-
haven country have lower worldwide effective tax rates than firms without tax haven 
operations (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009). Thus, there is a clear economic link between the use 
of tax havens and corporate tax avoidance strategies. The use of tax havens for firms’ 
material operations is also a choice made by firms’ top executives and hence reflects the tone 
at the top, at least as portrayed in the media. All our measures are increasing in tax avoidance, 
and the detailed explanation of each measure is described in the Appendix. 
3.4 Research design for the main analyses 
 To test H1, we estimate the following regression: 
TAXit = α + βGCit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit,                      (1) 
where TAX refers to the measure of tax avoidance (ETR, PRED_UTB, SHELTER and 
NTAXHAVEN); GC is an indicator that equals one if the general counsel is in top 
                                                 
15 Based on a sample of identified tax shelter participants, Wilson (2009) develops a model to detect potential 
tax sheltering participants based on several observable firm characteristics. We use the estimated coefficients 
from his regression model to measure the likelihood of a firm’s involvement in tax sheltering activities. 
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management for a particular firm-year; FIRM_CONTROLS refers to a vector of firm-level 
controls and YEAR_FE and IND_FE refer to time and industry fixed-effects, respectively. 
The appendix includes the detailed definition of all variables. 
 We select FIRM_CONTROLS, which prior literature has documented as being 
associated with tax avoidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Hoopes et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 
2012a). We include a comprehensive list of control variables to help alleviate the omitted 
correlated variable concern arising from potential endogeneity of having a general counsel in 
top management: net operating loss carry forward (NOL and NOLCHG), foreign income (FI), 
inventory intensity (INVENTORY), property, plant and equipment (PPE), capital expenditure 
(CAPEX), research and development intensity (RD), intangibles (INTANG), equity income 
(EI) and number of segments (NSEG). In addition, we control for discretionary accruals 
(DACC) because Frank et al. (2009) find that financial reporting aggressiveness is positively 
associated with tax reporting aggressiveness. We control for legal settlement (LITIGATION) 
because Lisowsky (2010) finds that insurance or litigation payouts are an informative sign of 
tax sheltering. We control for institutional ownership (IOHOLD), Big 5 auditors (BIG5) and 
external monitoring by the IRS (IRS_AUDIT) because these external governance mechanisms 
can influence tax avoidance (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Hoopes et al. 2012). Finally, 
we control for return-on-assets (ROA), leverage (LEV), size (SIZE) and market-to-book (MB) 
as general controls for firm performance, capital structure other firm characteristics that may 
influence firm’s inclination to avoid tax. In examining NTAXHAVEN as a measure of tax 
avoidance, we additionally control for the number of countries that the firm has a significant 
subsidiary to avoid a mechanical relation between the number of tax haven countries and the 
number of countries that the firm operates in. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
for our empirical estimation when the dependent variables are ETR, PRED_UTB and 
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SHELTER, and we use poisson regression when the dependent variable is NTAXHAVEN 
because the latter is a count variable.  
  
4.  Main Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 2 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the regression variables for the 
propensity score matched sample. The sample size varies for the various tax measures 
depending on data availability to compute the measures (from 6,849 observations for 
NTAXHAVEN to 11,245 for SHELTER). Table 2 Panel B reports the Pearson correlation of 
the main variables in our paper. The Pearson correlations between the four measures of tax 
avoidance (ETR, PRED_UTB, SHELTER and NTAXHAVEN) are positively correlated with 
one another, which suggest that all four capture tax planning activities in general. However, 
the correlations among the four measures, between 0.08 and 0.67, suggest that each measure 
likely captures a different dimension of tax avoidance and hence supports our choice of using 
all four in our analyses to triangulate our results and increase the robustness of our findings. 
Turning to our variable of interest, we find that the presence of general counsel in top 
management (GC) is positive and significantly correlated with three measures of tax 
avoidance (ETR, PRED_UTB and NTAXHAVEN), while it is positive but insignificantly 
correlated with SHELTER. Because these are pairwise univariate correlations, we defer the 
main analyses to multivariate tests in section 4.2.  
4.2 Main empirical analyses – Test of H1 
Table 3 reports our results for the test of H1, which examines the association between 
the presence of a general counsel in top management and corporate tax avoidance. As shown 
in Panel A where we present the results for the propensity score matched sample, the 
presence of a general counsel in top management is positive and significantly associated with 
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all four measures of tax avoidance (significant at the 1% level when we examine PRED_UTB 
and SHELTER, significant at the 5% level when we examine NTAXHAVEN, and significant at 
the 10% level when we examine ETR). This result is more supportive of the view that a 
general counsel in top management uses her legal expertise to facilitate corporate tax 
avoidance. The effect of having a general counsel in top management on tax avoidance is also 
economically significant. Specifically, firms with a general counsel in top management are 
associated with a 1.8%, 1.2%, 7.5% and 2.5% increase in tax avoidance as proxied by ETR, 
PRED_UTB, SHELTER and NTAXHAVEN, respectively, even after including a 
comprehensive list of control variables.16,17  
 While the propensity score matching research design helps alleviate potential 
endogeneity concerns associated with the decision to place the general counsel in top 
management, a potential drawback of this research design is that it reduces sample size and 
the generalizability of our findings.18 To ensure the robustness of our results, we re-estimate 
our regression on the full sample in Table 3 Panel B. As observed from this table, the 
coefficients on PRED_UTB, SHELTER and NTAXHAVEN remain positive and significant at 
the 1% level, while ETR remains positive but loses significance. 
Overall, the above analyses indicate that the general counsel in top management likely 
plays an important facilitating role in advising firms in their strategic tax planning activities. 
                                                 
16 The impact of having a general counsel in top management (GC) on the ETR (OLS regression) is computed 
as 0.006 (coefficient on GC) ÷ 0.329 (the absolute value of the sample mean of ETR) = 1.8%. The impact of 
having a general counsel in top management (GC) on the NTAXHAVEN (poisson regression) is computed as 
(e0.066 - 1) ÷ 2.768 (the absolute value of the sample mean of ETR) = 2.5%. The other comparative statics are 
computed analogously. 
17 By including a comprehensive list of control variables, we are leaving less variation for the general counsel 
in top management effect to “pick up.” For instance, if the general counsel imposes her influence over tax 
avoidance via research and development activities (through utilization of tax credits), by including research and 
development intensity as our control variable, we inevitably biased our general counsel effect towards zero. 
While our documented economic magnitude is not large per se, our tests provide a conservative estimate of the 
general counsel influence on tax avoidance. In fact, one might even argue that this estimate is a realistic one 
given that tax avoidance is a function of many determinants, the multiple roles of general counsels, and noise in 
the measures that we are using to examine the effect of general counsels in top management on tax avoidance. 
18 To ensure the robustness of our findings based on the propensity score matching design, we vary the 
following design choices: 1) matching with replacement; 2) varying the closeness of the match by adjusting the 
caliper between 0.01 to 0.05. Our inferences are unchanged (results available upon request). 
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4.3 Difference-in-differences analysis 
As an alternative approach to address endogeneity concerns using propensity score 
matching, we conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. If the omitted correlated 
variables that affect both the presence of the general counsel in top management and the 
extent of tax avoidance are time-invariant, they are controlled for in the DID analysis. In 
particular, we utilize a DID research design on our full sample, as in Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and Chan et al. (2012, 2015), and examine the impact on tax avoidance 
when the general counsel becomes part of top management. We construct two variables: 1) 
an indicator variable (GCFIRM) that equals one if the firm has a general counsel in the top 
management during the sample period, and zero otherwise; 2) an indicator variable 
(POST_GCFIRM) that equals one for firms that has a general counsel in the top management 
(GCFIRM = 1) for firm-years after the general counsel becomes part of the top management, 
and zero otherwise. The coefficient on GCFIRM captures the difference in tax avoidance 
between firms with general counsel in top management (i.e., treatment firm) and the other 
firms in the period before the general counsel becomes part of top management. The 
coefficient on POST_GCFIRM captures the incremental effect of GCFIRM on tax avoidance 
after the general counsel becomes part of top management (POST_GCFIRM is essentially the 
interaction between the GCFIRM and an indicator for the period after the general counsel 
becomes part of top management).19  
Table 4 Panel A presents the result from this analysis. We find that the coefficient on 
GCFIRM is insignificantly different from zero (with the exception of ETR, which is negative 
                                                 
19 In Table 4 Panel B, we exclude firm-years where the treatment firm becomes a non-treatment firm to have a 
cleaner set of treatment firms. In Table 4 Panel B, we separately examine the effect when the general counsel 
no longer becomes part of top management. In this analysis, we also restrict the treatment sample to firms with 
at least two periods before the general counsel becomes part of top management and at least two periods after 




and significant);20 that is, there is no significant difference in tax avoidance between firms 
with general counsel in top management and those without in the period before the general 
counsel becomes part of top management. However, we observe a significant increase in all 
four measures of tax avoidance after the general counsel becomes part of top management 
(significant at the 1% level for PRED_UTB and SHELTER, and significant at the 5% level for 
ETR and NTAXHAVEN). This result indicates that the general counsel in top management has 
a causal effect on tax avoidance after she becomes part of top management, presumably as a 
result of her increased influence within the top management team which thus facilitates her 
role in advising the firm in its tax planning.  
In Table 4 Panel B, we separately examine the incremental effect when the general 
counsel is no longer part of top management. In particular, we include a new indicator 
variable POSTDROPGCFIRM that equals one for firms that has a general counsel in the top 
management during the sample period (GCFIRM = 1) for firm-years after the general counsel 
is no longer part of top management, and zero otherwise. As observed from this table, all the 
coefficients on POSTGCFIRM remain positive and significant, while none of the coefficient 
on POSTDROPGCFIRM is significant. This result suggests that the general counsel in top 
management may have a lasting and continuing impact on tax planning activities even after 
she is no longer part of top management. 
Overall, the robust results based on the DID analysis strengthens our earlier inference 
that the general counsel in top management influences tax avoidance, mitigating concerns 
that our results are driven by omitted correlated variables. 
4.4 Are our results driven by CEO and CFO compensation incentives? 
 Hopkins et al. (2015) highlight that the documented effects of general counsel in top 
management could be due to CEO and CFO compensation incentives. Prior research also 
                                                 
20 Arguably, firms with high effective tax rates (low values of ETR) may decide to have a general counsel in top 
management to reduce their effective tax rates. 
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finds that CEO and CFO compensation incentives are associated with tax avoidance (Rego 
and Wilson 2012).21 To the extent that the general counsel’s compensation incentives are 
positively correlated with the CEO and CFO compensation incentives, then our finding of an 
association between general counsel in top management and tax avoidance may be picking 
CEO and CFO compensation incentives. For instance, the general counsel in top management 
is one of the highest compensated executives within the firm, and to the extent that firms with 
highly paid general counsels also have highly paid CEOs and CFOs, our findings may be 
picking up the effects of highly compensated CEOs and CFOs rather than the effect of having 
a general counsel in top management.  
In the spirit of Hopkins et al. (2015), we conduct additional robustness analyses 
controlling for CEO and CFO incentives. For this purpose, we include CEO and CFO total 
compensation in our main regression specification.22 As observed in Table 5 Panel A, our 
coefficient of interest (GC) remains positive and significant, which suggests that our results 
are not driven by highly compensated CEO and CFO. 
 CEO and CFO compensation incentives largely consist of stock-based incentives, and 
prior work suggests that executives’ stock-based compensation exerts significant influence 
over important reporting decisions such as financial reporting and voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Nagar et al. 2003; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon  2006; Jiang et al. 
2010). To the extent that the general counsel’s stock-based compensation is positively 
correlated with the CEO and CFO stock-based compensation, our documented effect of 
general counsel in top management may be picking up the effect of CEO and CFO stock-
based compensation. To mitigate this concern, we include CEO and CFO stock-based 
                                                 
21 On the other hand, in a comprehensive analysis of incentives and corporate tax avoidance using proprietary 
data, Armstrong et al. (2012) do not find robust evidence that CEO and CFO compensation incentives are 
associated with tax avoidance. 
22 We do not include the general counsel’s total compensation in the regression because it would require 




compensation in our main regression, and the results are presented in Table 5 Panel B. As 
observed from this table, our coefficient of interest (GC) remains positive and significant.  
 Finally, Rego and Wilson (2012) find that executives’ risk incentives are positively 
associated with greater tax avoidance.23  Therefore, we include both pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (PPS) and risk incentives (VEGA) of the CEO and CFO in our main regression to 
mitigate concerns that our measure of general counsel in top management is merely picking 
up CEO and CFO risk incentives, and the results are presented in Table 5 Panel C. As 
reported in this table, our coefficient of interest (GC) remains positive and significant. 
 Overall, the above robustness analyses suggest that our conclusion that the general 
counsel exerts significant influence over strategic tax planning remains unchanged, after 
controlling for the compensation incentives of the CEO and CFO. 
4.5 Use of general counsel in top management fixed effects 
 Following prior studies that examine whether individual executives impose their 
personal management style on corporate policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bamber et 
al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011; Law and Mills 2014), we provide further 
evidence that individual general counsels exert a significant effect on tax avoidance by 
focusing our analyses on general counsels in top management that move from one firm to 
another within our sample.24 The idea here is that facilitating tax planning may be an innate 
ability and/or individual style of the general counsel and that these characteristics follow the 
general counsel as she moves from the top management of one firm to that of another. To run 
the analyses with general counsel (in top management) fixed effects, we perform three sets of 
tests: 1) analyses of general counsel fixed effects after controlling for firm fixed effects; 2) 
                                                 
23 Compensation risk incentives is measured using option vega, which measures the change in value of a 
manager’s equity portfolio in response to a given change in stock return volatility and hence provides an 
estimate of the payoff to managers for increasing firm risk. Following Rego and Wilson (2012), we only 
include stock options, but not common shareholdings in our computation of risk incentives because Guay 
(1999) finds that stock options, but not common stockholdings, play an economically significant role in 
increasing the convexity of the relation between managers’ wealth and stock price. 
24 In our sample, 152 general counsels are part of top management in at least two firms. 
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analyses of general counsel fixed effects after controlling for firm and CEO fixed effects; and 
3) analyses of general counsel fixed effects after controlling for firm, CEO and CFO fixed 
effects.25 In this set of analyses, the firm fixed effects in the model control for all stationary 
firm characteristics such as industry and time-invariant firm-level strategies for tax 
avoidance. The other control variables capture firm characteristics that can change over time 
and that could plausibly be related to tax avoidance.  
 The results are reported in Table 6. As documented in Panel A, we find the individual 
general counsels who are part of top management impose significant individual influence 
over tax avoidance activities as they move from one firm to another (significant at the 1% 
level). The incremental R-square of including the general counsel ranges from 0.5% to 8.6%, 
even after controlling for firm fixed effects and a comprehensive list of firm-level controls 
that have been documented to influence tax avoidance. In Panel B and Panel C, we 
progressively include CEO and CFO fixed effects in the model and we continue to document 
a significant general counsel effect (at the 5% level or better) in at least three measures of tax 
avoidance. Overall, the results corroborate our earlier findings that general counsels in top 
management exert significant influence over tax avoidance. 
 
5.  Further Analyses of the Positive Association between a General Counsel in Top 
Management and Tax Avoidance 
 In this section, we provide additional analyses to corroborate our earlier findings and 
provide greater insights into the role of the general counsel in tax avoidance. In section 5.1, 
we examine whether the extent to which general counsels in top management can influence 
                                                 
25 Note that when we control for individual CEO and CFO fixed effects, we follow Ge et al. (2011) and do not 
require CEOs and CFOs to have worked in more than one firm in our sample because imposing this restriction 
will reduce our sample size substantially. As such, for some subsets of CEOs and CFOs, we cannot disentangle 
the CEO or CFO effect from the firm effect. Hence, the joint significance of CEOs and CFOs should be 
interpreted cautiously. However, given that our purpose for including CEO and CFO fixed effects is to examine 
whether individual general counsel imposes specific style on tax avoidance over and above CEO and CFO 
style, our interpretation is not affected. 
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tax avoidance is a function of their tax expertise, or expertise in other related areas such as 
accounting and finance. In section 5.2, we examine whether there is greater tax avoidance 
associated with general counsel in top management when the firm hires an external auditor 
with tax-specific industry experience or purchases more non-audit tax services from its 
external auditor. Finally, in section 5.3, we examine whether the extent to which general 
counsels can influence tax avoidance is moderated by whether the CEO is relatively more 
powerful than the general counsel in the top management team. For these cross-sectional 
analyses, we restrict our sample to firms that have the general counsel as part of top 
management.   
5.1 General counsel in top management with tax-related expertise  
In our discussions earlier, we argue that the general counsel needs only broad legal 
subject matter expertise and it is not necessary that she has to be a tax attorney or has the tax 
expertise to influence the firm’s tax behavior. Nonetheless, our inference that the general 
counsel can influence tax decisions and aid in tax planning can be strengthened if we find 
some evidence that tax avoidance would be greater when the general counsel has tax 
expertise. Specifically, with such expertise, the general counsel has a better understanding of 
complex tax issues and is able to better advise top management on tax planning and develop 
more sophisticated tax strategies that can result in even greater tax savings. Along similar line 
of reasoning, Hopkins et al. (2015) find that firms with highly compensated general counsels 
have lower financial reporting quality, and among firms with highly paid general counsels, 
general counsels with financial expertise have poorer reporting quality and are more likely to 
engage in earnings management.  Based on the above arguments, we predict as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on the general counsel being part of top management, tax 
avoidance is greater when the general counsel has tax expertise. 
30 
 
For our sample of general counsels in top management, we obtain their biographies 
from BoardEx and other online sources such as Bloomberg, Equilar, and Zoominfo. We 
define an indicator variable GC_TAXEXP that equals one if the general counsel has a tax 
education background (e.g., a MS in Taxation or an LL.M in Taxation) or work experience in 
tax, and zero otherwise. A limitation of this approach is that some biographies are more 
detailed than others and even for many general counsels with a law degree, there is no 
indication of a specialization. We find limited number of general counsels who provide clear 
indications that they have a tax background. Hence, we also use an alternative measure of tax 
expertise with the assumption that a general counsel with an accounting and finance 
background is also more likely to be somewhat knowledgeable about tax. The indicator 
variable GC_TAXACCFINEXP equals one if the general counsel has an education 
background or work experience in tax, accounting, or finance, and zero otherwise.26  
Panel A of Table 7 first reports the results based on general counsels with solely tax 
expertise. When we examine ETR as proxies for tax avoidance, we find that the coefficient on 
GC_TAXEXP is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent 
with our prediction that conditional on the general counsel as part of top management, tax 
avoidance is greater when the general counsel has tax expertise. We do not find significant 
results when we examine PRED_UTB, SHELTER and NTAXHAVEN as proxies for tax 
avoidance. However, turning to Panel B, we find that the coefficient on 
GC_TAXACCFINEXP is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level when we 
examine ETR and PRED_UTB as proxies for tax avoidance and is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level when we examine SHELTER as a proxy for tax avoidance. These 
results provide some evidence on the role of the general counsel in influencing tax avoidance. 
                                                 
26 In our sample, 3.2% of the firm-year observations with general counsel in top management have a tax 
background, while 23.0% have a tax, accounting or finance background. 
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When the general counsel has expertise in the area of tax, or in related areas such as 
accounting, or finance, she is in a better position to facilitate greater tax avoidance.  
As an additional analysis, we examine how the experience of the general counsel in 
top management affects tax avoidance. The intuition behind this analysis is that when the 
general counsel has been part of top management for a longer period of time, she would 
presumably have gained more intimate knowledge of the firm as well as its business 
strategies. This expertise enables her to contribute more to the tax planning to reduce taxes. 
To test this argument, we define a variable GC_EXPERIENCE, which is the number of years 
the general counsel has been part of the top management team. Panel C of Table 7 tabulates 
our findings. We find that the coefficient on GC_ EXPERIENCE is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level when we examine ETR and SHELTER as proxies for tax avoidance 
and is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level when we examine NTAXHAVEN 
as a proxy for tax avoidance. This result suggests that the extent to which the general counsel 
can facilitate tax planning increases with her experience as part of the top management team 
of the firm.  
5.2 General counsel in top management and tax services provided by external auditor 
 Although the tax expertise of the general counsel is beneficial to tax planning, a 
general counsel can also enhance the tax capabilities of the firm by relying on external 
sources, such as the tax services provided by the external auditor.27 For instance, McGuire et 
al. (2012a) find that firms purchasing tax services from their external auditor  engage in 
greater tax avoidance when their external auditor is a tax expert or an overall expert (i.e., 
having combined tax and audit expertise). Cook and Omer (2012) document a positive effect 
of tax services fees on tax avoidance, and Hogan and Noga (2012) show that companies 
increasing (decreasing) their tax services are associated with more (less) tax avoidance over 
                                                 
27 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this set of analysis. 
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the long run. Taken together, these studies suggest that the general counsel can enhance the 
tax capabilities and/or competence of the legal department, hence better facilitating tax 
planning, if the firm hires an external auditor with tax (or overall) expertise or purchase more 
tax services from its external auditor. Hence, we predict as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Conditional on the general counsel being part of top management, tax 
avoidance is greater if the firm hires an external auditor with tax (or overall) 
expertise or when there is higher tax services fees paid to the external auditor. 
 Following McGuire et al. (2012a), we define tax (audit) market share as total tax 
(audit) fees paid to the audit firm divided by total tax (audit) fees paid to all other audit firms 
in the same industry and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Tax (audit) expertise is 
defined as a tax (audit) service market share in a given MSA (city) and industry (two-digit 
SIC) market share that is greater than or equal to 24 percent before year 2002 or 30 percent 
on or after year 2002.28  The indicator variable AUD_TAXEXP equals one if the firm is 
audited by an audit firm that is a tax expert. The indicator variable AUD_OVERALLEXP 
equals one if the firm is audited by an audit firm that is both an audit and tax expert. Finally, 
the variable TAXFEES is defined as tax fees divided by the total fees paid to the firm’s 
external auditor.  
The results are tabulated in Table 8. In Panel A, when we examine PRED_UTB and 
SHELTER as proxies for tax avoidance, we find that the coefficient on AUD_TAXEXP is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that conditional on 
the general counsel as part of top management, tax avoidance is greater when the firm hires 
an auditor with tax-specific industry experience. The coefficient on AUD_TAXEXP is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level when we examine NTAXHAVEN as a 
proxy for tax avoidance. The unexpected result obtained for NTAXHAVEN may reflect 
                                                 
28 The minimum national industry market share is 30%, following Neal and Riley (2004), who define the 
minimum as 1.2 times the inverse of the number of Big N auditors. Following McGuire et al. (2012a), we use 
their formula to apply to our city-industry auditor expertise setting. 
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auditors’ concern over the use of potentially controversial foreign tax havens. The results 
based on AUD_OVERALLEXP and TAXFEES are generally consistent with those based on 
AUD_TAXEXP. Specifically, in Panel B (Panel C), we find that the coefficient on 
AUD_OVERALLEXP (TAXFEES) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or 
better when we examine PRED_UTB and SHELTER as proxies for tax avoidance. We do not 
find significant results when we examine ETR and NTAXHAVEN as proxies for tax avoidance. 
Overall, the above findings provide some support for our contention that conditional on the 
general counsel being part of top management, the hiring of an external auditor with tax or 
overall expertise or greater use of non-audit tax services can further facilitate the general 
counsel’s role in tax planning and developing tax strategies.  
5.3 The power of the CEO over the general counsel  
 Among the top executives of the firm, the CEO is likely to experience the greatest 
pressure to maximize firm value (Rego and Wilson 2012). As discussed earlier, a possible 
way to maximize firm value is to adopt tax policies that maximize after-tax income. Prior 
studies have investigated the relative power/status of the different constituents within an 
organization, with the underlying assumption that if one constituent has relatively more 
power than another, the former is able to exert a greater influence on certain outcomes (e.g., 
Kwak et al. 2012; Badolato et al. 2013). In the context of tax avoidance, it is plausible that 
the more power that CEO has within the top management team, the more likely she is able to 
exert her influence on the general counsel to facilitate active tax planning. Hence, our next 
prediction is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Conditional on the general counsel being part of top management, tax 
avoidance is greater when the CEO has more power over the general counsel. 
We define three different measures of the CEO’s relative power: (1) CEO’s total 
compensation divided by the general counsel’s total compensation (CEO_RELPOWER), (2) 
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CEO’s total compensation divided by the total compensation paid to the top five executives 
of the firm (CEO_PAYSLICE), following Bebchuk et al. (2011), and (3) an indicator variable 
that equals one if the general counsel becomes part of top management within the first year 
that the current CEO is appointed, and zero if the general counsel is part of top management 
before the current CEO is appointed (CEO_APPTGC).  Table 9 presents the results. In Panel 
A, when we examine SHELTER, PRED_UTB, and NTAXHAVEN as proxies for tax 
avoidance, the coefficient on CEO_RELPOWER is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level or better. Similarly, in Panel B, for the same tax proxies, the coefficient on 
CEO_PAYSLICE is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better. These 
results are consistent with our prediction that when the CEO is relatively more powerful than 
the general counsel in the top management team, she is better able to exert more influence on 
the general counsel to facilitate active tax planning and pursue tax savings. In Panel C, we do 
not find any significant results when we examine general counsel’s relative power in top 
management based on when she is part of top management (CEO_APPTGC). One possible 
explanation is that the inclusion of general counsel in top management after the CEO has 
taken office is largely based on the legal needs of the organization, as opposed to trying to 
capture the monitors of the CEO (and the rest of the top management) (Coles et al., 2014). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Motivated by calls for more research on the role of the general counsel in corporate 
tax avoidance and the recent literature studying the economic consequences of having a 
general counsel in top management (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), we document that the 
presence of a general counsel in top management is associated with greater tax avoidance. 
Specifically, we find that firms with general counsel as part of the top management team have 
lower effective tax rate, more uncertain tax positions, a higher likelihood of engaging in tax 
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shelter activities, and more tax haven countries in which the firm reports a significant 
subsidiary, relative to firms without a general counsel in top management. We also follow 
prior literature (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge et 
al. 2011) and examine whether individual general counsels who are part of top management 
impose their individual influence over tax avoidance as they move to another firm. We 
document a significant general counsel (in top management) individual fixed effect, over and 
above firm, CEO and CFO fixed effect. In addition, we find that among firms with general 
counsel in top management, tax avoidance is greater when (1) the general counsel has tax-
related expertise, (2) the firm hires an external auditor with tax expertise or purchases more 
tax services from its external auditor, and (3) the CEO has more power over the general 
counsel. Overall, our results suggest that a general counsel in top management can have a 
significant influence on a firm’s tax decisions, and the general counsel using her legal 
expertise and insights acquired from being part of the top management team to facilitate tax 
planning in the firm. 
We emphasize that our results should not be taken to mean that firms with a general 
counsel in top management are more likely to engage in tax evasion or fraud. Greater tax 
avoidance simply means the adoption of tax strategies that reduce explicit taxes. While the 
literature generally assumes that greater tax avoidance are more likely to test or go beyond 
the boundaries of tax laws, our measures are not able to distinguish between legal and illegal 
tax strategies. Hence, for many firms with general counsels in top management, the reason 
that they pay less taxes could simply be a reflection of more effective tax planning. 
While prior studies have documented that top managers, particularly the CEO and tax 
directors, exert significant influence over firms’ tax policies (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 
2006; Dyreng et al. 2010; Rego and Wilson 2012; Armstrong et al. 2012), our study shows 
that a general counsel in top management can also affect tax policies. Our findings further 
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add to the literature on the role of the general counsel in contributing to strategic and 
operational decisions in the top management team (Nelson and Nielson 2000; DeMott 2005). 
Finally, our study also contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of tax 
avoidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Kim and Zhang 2011; Rego and Wilson 2012; McGuire et 
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ETR Annual GAAP effective tax rate, defined as total tax expense (TXT) 
divided by pre-tax income (PI). The denominator (pre-tax income) is 
required to be positive to compute this measure, and is then winsorized 
to 0 and 1. Finally, this variable is multiplied by negative one so that it 
is increasing in tax avoidance. 
PRED_UTB The predicted unrecognized tax benefits based on Lisowsky et al. 
(2013), computed as: 
PRED_UTB = 0.0089  SIZE – 0.0010  PP&E + 0.0036  R&D + 
0.0011  M&A + 0.0008  FOR_SALE + 0.0052  CRTY + 0.0010  
TAXHAVEN + 0.0016  EQEARN + 0.0004  MEZZFIN + 0.0006  
AOCI + 0.0036  DEFREV + 0.0103  STKCOMP + 0.0016  NOL – 
0.0003  NEXUS, 
where SIZE is the log of total assets, PP&E is the ratio of property, 
plant and equipment scaled by total assets, R&D is research and 
development expenditure scaled by lagged total assets, M&A is an 
indicator variable equals one if the firm engaged in an M&A 
transaction as the acquirer in the current year, zero otherwise, 
FOR_SALE is the percentage of foreign sales, CRTY is the natural log 
of the number of distinct countries (other than the U.S.) in which the 
firm reports a significant subsidiary per 10-K Schedule 21 of the 
current year, TAXHAVEN is an indicator equals one if firm reports in 
10-K Schedule 21 a tax haven subsidiary, zero otherwise, EQEARN is 
the ratio of the absolute value of equity in earnings, divided by the 
absolute value of income before extraordinary items, MEZZFIN is the 
ratio of convertible debt and preferred stock scaled by total assets, 
AOCI is the ratio of the absolute value of accumulated other 
comprehensive income scaled by total assets, DEFREV is an indicator 
equals one if deferred revenue is non-zero, zero otherwise, STKCOMP 
is an indicator equals one if stock compensation expense is non-zero, 
zero otherwise, NOL is an indicator equals one if net operating loss 
carry-forward is non-zero, zero otherwise, NEXUS is an indicator 
equals one if SIC code is in the range (4000-4899) and (5000-5999), 
zero otherwise. Following Lisowsky et al. (2013), we compute the 
above measures based on three-year measures: 1) we set indicator 
variables equal to 1 if the one-year measure is equal to 1 in any of the 
current or prior two years; 2) we set ratio and natural log measures 
equal to the average of the one-year measure for the current and prior 
two years; 3) for R&D, we compute the sum over the current and prior 
two years. Because the tax haven data is available up to only August 
2010, we extend the tax haven data to 2012 by filling the data forward 
by up to two years. This assumption is reasonable because the one-year 
ahead (two-year ahead) time series correlation of tax haven use is 0.90 
(0.81).We thank Scott Dyreng for providing the data to compute CRTY 
and TAXHAVEN. 
SHELTER The tax shelter prediction score developed by Wilson (2009), computed 
as: 
SHELTER = -4.30 + 6.63  BTD - 1.72  LEV + 0.66  SIZE + 2.26  
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ROA + 1.62  FI + 1.56  R&D,  
where BTD refers to book income less taxable income scaled by lagged 
total assets, LEV refers to long term debt divided by total assets, SIZE 
refers to the log of total assets, ROA refers to pre-tax earnings divided 
by total assets, FI refers to an indicator variable equals one for firm 
observations reporting foreign income, zero otherwise, and R&D refers 
to the research and development expenditure divided by lagged total 
assets. 
NTAXHAVEN The number of distinct tax haven countries in which the firm reports a 
significant subsidiary per 10-K Schedule 21. We thank Scott Dyreng 
for providing the data to compute NTAXHAVEN. 
GC An indicator variable that equals one if the general counsel is in the top 
management and zero otherwise. 
TRADVOL The average daily trading volume divided by the number of shares 
outstanding over the fiscal year. 
BETA The slope coefficient from regressing daily returns on the CRSP Equal-
Weighted Index for the fiscal year. 
RET The buy-and-hold returns for the fiscal year. 
MINRET The minimum of the daily stock returns for the fiscal year. 
RETSKEW The skewness of daily stock returns for the fiscal year. 
RETVOL The standard deviation of daily stock returns for the fiscal year. 
INDLITIG An indicator variable that equals one if the firm belongs to the 
following high litigation industries: Biotechnology (SIC 2833-2836), 
Computer Hardware (SIC 3570-3577), Electronics (SIC 3600-3674), 
Retail (SIC 5200-5961) and Computer Software (SIC 7371-7379), and 
zero otherwise. 
LAWSUIT An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is being sued in the 
current fiscal year or has a history of lawsuit(s), and zero otherwise. 
Data for lawsuits is obtained from the Stanford Law School Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse. 
PCTGC The percentage of firms with general counsel in the top management in 
the same industry-year. 
FIRMAGE Firm age measured by the number of years the company has had data 
on Compustat. 
NUMEXEC The number of executives listed in the annual Proxy statement for the 
fiscal year. 
CEOCHAIR An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board of directors, and zero otherwise. 
CEOTENURE The number of years that the current CEO has been appointed. 
IOHOLD The percentage of institutional ownership for the fiscal year. 
TURNOVER An indicator variable that equals one if there is either a CEO or CFO 
turnover in the current or prior fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
RD Research and development expenses (XRD) scaled by total assets (AT) 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. XRD is set to zero if missing. 
INTANG Intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets (AT) at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. INTAN is set to zero if missing. 
FI Foreign income (PIFO) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. PIFO is set to zero if missing. 




ROA Pre-tax income (PI) scaled by total assets (AT) at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
LEV Long term debt (DLTT) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (PRCC_F  CSHO) 
at the end of the fiscal year. 
MB The market value of equity (PRCC_F  CSHO) scaled by the book 
value of equity (CEQ), measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
NOL An indicator variable that equals one if the loss carry forward (TLCF) 
is positive at the beginning of the fiscal year and zero otherwise. 
NOLCHG Change in loss carry forward (TLCF) scaled by total assets (AT) at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
INVENTORY Total inventory (INVT) scaled by total assets (AT) at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. 
PPE Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
CAPEX Total capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by total assets (AT) at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
EI Equity income in earnings (ESUB) scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. ESUB is set to zero if missing. 
DACC Discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model with lagged return-on-assets, following 
Kothari et al. (2005). 
LITIGATION An indicator variable that equals one if pre-tax (SETP) or after-tax 
(SETA) litigation/insurance settlement is negative, indicating a payout, 
and zero otherwise. 
BIG5 An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is audited by Deloitte 
& Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG or Arthur 
Andersen, and zero otherwise. 
IRS_AUDIT The probability of IRS audit, measured by the number of face-to-face 
corporate audits completed in IRS fiscal year t in asset class a, divided 
by the total number of 1120s filed in the same year t and same asset 
class a. Data obtained from the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse. 
NCOUNTRIES The number of distinct countries (other than the U.S.) in which the firm 
reports a significant subsidiary per 10-K Schedule 21. We thank Scott 
Dyreng for providing the data to compute NCOUNTRIES. 
GCFIRM An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a general counsel in 
the top management during the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
POSTGCFIRM An indicator variable that equals one for firms that has a general 
counsel in the top management (GCFIRM = 1) for firm-years after the 
general counsel becomes part of the top management, and zero 
otherwise. 
POSTDROPGCFIRM An indicator variable that equals one for firms that has a general 
counsel in the top management during the sample period (GCFIRM =1) 
for firm-years after the general counsel is no longer part of top 
management, and zero otherwise. 




LNCFOCOMP The natural logarithm of the CFO’s total compensation for the fiscal 
year. 
CEOSTKCOMP CEO’s stock-based compensation, scaled by total compensation for the 
fiscal year. 
CFOSTKCOMP CFO’s stock-based compensation, scaled by total compensation for the 
fiscal year. 
CEOPPS The natural logarithm of the sensitivity of the change in the CEO’s 
equity portfolio value to a 1% change in stock price, computed 
similarly to Core and Guay (2002). 
CEOVEGA The natural logarithm of the sensitivity of the change in the CEO’s 
option portfolio value to a 1% change in stock price, computed 
similarly to Guay (1999). 
CFOPPS The natural logarithm of the sensitivity of the change in the CFO’s 
equity portfolio value to a 1% change in stock price, computed 
similarly to Core and Guay (2002). 
CFOVEGA The natural logarithm of the sensitivity of the change in the CFO’s 
option portfolio value to a 1% change in stock price, computed 
similarly to Guay (1999). 
GC_TAXEXP An indicator variable that equals one if the general counsel in the top 
management has an education background or work experience in tax, 
and zero otherwise. Data obtained from Bloomberg, BoardEx, Equilar, 
Zoominfo and other online sources. 
GC_TAXACCFINEXP An indicator variable that equals one if the general counsel in the top 
management has an education background or work experience in tax, 
accounting or finance, and zero otherwise. Data obtained from 
Bloomberg, BoardEx, Equilar, Zoominfo and other online sources. 
GC_EXPERIENCE The general counsel’s number of years of experience in the top 
management. 
AUD_TAXEXP An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is audited by an audit 
firm that is a tax expert. Tax expertise is defined as a tax service market 
share in a given MSA (city) and industry (two-digit SIC) market share 
that is greater than or equal to 24 percent before year 2002 or 30 
percent on or after year 2002. Market share is defined as total tax fees 
paid to the audit firm divided by total tax fees paid to all other audit 
firms in the same industry and MSA. 
AUD_ALLEXP An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is audited by an audit 
firm that is both an audit and tax expert. Audit (tax) expertise is defined 
as an audit (tax) service market share in a given MSA (city) and 
industry (two-digit SIC) market share that is greater than or equal to 24 
percent before year 2002 or 30 percent on or after year 2002. Market 
share is defined as total (audit) tax fees paid to the audit firm divided by 
total (audit) tax fees paid to all other audit firms in the same industry 
and MSA. 
AUD_TAXFEES Tax fees divided by the total fees paid to the firm’s external auditor. 
CEO_RELPOWER CEO’s total compensation divided by the general counsel’s total 
compensation. 
CEO_PAYSLICE CEO’s total compensation divided by the total compensation paid to the 
top five executives of the firm. 
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CEO_APPTGC An indicator variable that equals one if the general counsel becomes 
part of top management within the first year that the current CEO is 
appointed, and zero if the general counsel is part of top management 





Descriptive Statistics and Results of the Propensity Score Matching Procedure 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Determinants of General Counsel in Top Management for Propensity Score Matching 


















































































































































Year fixed effects YES 
 
 






Pseudo R-squared 0.0999 
  Area under ROC Curve 0.7056  
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TABLE 1 (continued) 




































































































































































 MB 3.3320   3.3559   3.3081   0.74   
This table presents the results of the propensity score matching procedure. Panel A provides the descriptive 
statistics of the 17,137 firm-year observations with available data for the propensity score matching and control 
variables in the main regression. Panel B provides the results of the logit regression to perform the propensity 
score matching. Panel C provides the descriptive statistics of the 11,420 firm-year observations identified by 
propensity score matching. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 





Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation of the Main Variables for the Propensity Score Matched 
Sample 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs.  Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
ETR 9,453 -0.3291 -0.3461 0.1488 -0.3830 -0.2800 
PRED_UTB 8,503 0.0857 0.0844 0.0180 0.0727 0.0983 
SHELTER 11,245 1.3400 1.4688 1.7936 0.1368 2.5666 
NTAXHAVEN 6,849 2.7678 2.0000 3.0805 0.0000 4.0000 
GC 11,420 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 
NOL 11,420 0.0733 0.0000 0.2245 0.0000 0.0364 
NOLCHG 11,420 0.0111 0.0000 0.0709 0.0000 0.0007 
FI 11,420 0.0220 0.0032 0.0404 0.0000 0.0344 
INVENTORY 11,420 0.1198 0.0928 0.1228 0.0185 0.1749 
PPE 11,420 0.2987 0.2192 0.2515 0.1113 0.4084 
CAPEX 11,420 0.0623 0.0406 0.0659 0.0225 0.0757 
RD 11,420 0.0373 0.0067 0.0620 0.0000 0.0491 
INTANG 11,420 0.2149 0.1449 0.2291 0.0286 0.3277 
EI 11,420 0.0009 0.0000 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 
NSEG 11,420 1.0506 1.0986 0.3899 0.6931 1.3863 
DACC 11,420 -0.0132 -0.0069 0.0983 -0.0531 0.0357 
LITIGATION 11,420 0.0985 0.0000 0.2980 0.0000 0.0000 
IOHOLD 11,420 0.7245 0.7538 0.2137 0.6056 0.8710 
BIG5 11,420 0.9536 1.0000 0.2104 1.0000 1.0000 
IRS_AUDIT 11,420 31.3091 30.5000 9.1701 26.3000 37.3000 
ROA 11,420 0.0807 0.0845 0.1282 0.0276 0.1457 
LEV 11,420 0.2065 0.1796 0.1901 0.0322 0.3116 
SIZE 11,420 7.3792 7.2222 1.6108 6.2820 8.3773 
MB 11,420 3.3320 2.2900 3.4468 1.5002 3.7068 
NCOUNTRIES 6,849 14.0892 9.0000 14.4673 3.0000 21.0000 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation of the Main Variables 
 
GC ETR PRED_UTB SHELTER NTAXHAVEN 
 GC 1.0000 
     ETR 0.0239** 1.0000 
    PRED_UTB 0.0348*** 0.1941*** 1.0000 
   SHELTER 0.0158 0.0752*** 0.6712*** 1.0000 
  NTAXHAVEN 0.0292** 0.0889*** 0.4046*** 0.6225*** 1.0000   
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main regression for the 11,420 firm-year 
observations identified by propensity score matching (Panel A) and the Pearson correlation of the main variables 
(Panel B). The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is multiplied by -1 so that 
all measures of tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 





General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matched Sample 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




























































































































































































































































































































      
0.039*** 
       
(0.001) 















       Observations 9,453   8,503   11,245   6,849 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1332   0.7998   0.7952   0.3777 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Full Sample 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




























































































































































































































































































































      
0.038*** 
       
(0.001) 















       Observations 14,194   12,357   16,866   10,248 




TABLE 3 (continued) 
This table reports the regression results for the relation between a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance. Panel A presents the results based on the propensity score matched sample, and Panel B presents the 
results based on the full sample. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is 
multiplied by -1 so that all measures of tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients, and are adjusted for 
clustering by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels or better, 





General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance  - Difference-in-Differences Analysis  
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences Analysis (Period after the general counsel becomes part of top 
management) 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 



































































       Observations 8,172   6,862   9,769   5,896 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1570   0.8158   0.7943   0.3687 
Panel B: Difference-in-Differences Analysis (Period after the general counsel becomes part of top 
management or is no longer part of top management) 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 


















































































       Observations 9,009   7,786   10,733   6,470 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1608   0.8184   0.7987   0.3646 
This table reports the regression results for the relation between a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance using a difference-in-differences research design. Panel A presents the results examining the 
incremental effect of having the general counsel in top management on tax avoidance, and Panel B presents the 
results examining the incremental effect of having and not having the general counsel in top management on tax 
avoidance. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is multiplied by -1 so that 
all measures of tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients, and are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels or better, respectively (one-tailed test 




General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance -  Controlling for Executive 
Compensation 
Panel A: Controlling for CEO & CFO Compensation 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 


















































































       Observations 8,450   8,007   10,088   6,018 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1324   0.8080   0.7966   0.3800 
Panel B: Controlling for CEO & CFO Stock-based Compensation 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 


















































































       Observations 8,450   8,007   10,088   6,018 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1321   0.8012   0.7942   0.3792 
Panel C: Controlling for CEO & CFO Pay-for-performance Sensitivity and Risk Incentives 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 



















































































































       Observations 8,462   8,015   10,103   6,031 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1324   0.8031   0.7945   0.3796 
This table reports the regression results for the relation between a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance, controlling for executive compensation. Panel A presents the results controlling for CEO’s and 
CFO’s total compensation, Panel B presents the results controlling for CEO’s and CFO’s stock-based 
compensation, and Panel C presents the results controlling for CEO’s and CFO’s pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and risk incentives. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is 
multiplied by -1 so that all measures of tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients, and are adjusted for 
clustering by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels or better, 





General Counsel and Tax Avoidance – General Counsel Fixed Effects 
Panel A: Firm and General Counsel Fixed Effects 
  F-test on fixed effects for: Controls/   R2  







ETR 2.143*** 1.483*** 
  
YES 787 0.478 0.564 
         PRED_UTB 11.940*** 3.767*** 
  
YES 773 0.950 0.965 
         SHELTER 6.806*** 2.435*** 
  
YES 1038 0.911 0.933 
         NTAXHAVEN 19.654*** 2.963*** 
  
YES 663 0.977 0.982 
                  
Panel B: Firm, CEO and General Counsel Fixed Effects 
  F-test on fixed effects for: Controls/   R2  







ETR 2.080*** 1.490** 1.935*** 
 
YES 720 0.554 0.611 
         PRED_UTB 12.300*** 3.289*** 2.698*** 
 
YES 700 0.967 0.973 
         SHELTER 6.430*** 2.617*** 2.187*** 
 
YES 949 0.935 0.945 
         NTAXHAVEN 17.689*** 3.319*** 1.592** 
 
YES 610 0.984 0.986 
                  
Panel C: Firm, CEO, CFO and General Counsel Fixed Effects 
  F-test on fixed effects for: Controls/   R2  







ETR 1.884*** 1.558** 1.585** 2.214*** YES 568 0.621 0.669 
         PRED_UTB 10.906*** 3.277*** 1.781*** 1.703** YES 597 0.974 0.977 
         SHELTER 6.140*** 2.415*** 1.266 1.793*** YES 770 0.938 0.946 
         NTAXHAVEN 15.449*** 2.471*** 2.762*** 0.700 YES 483 0.988 0.988 
                  
This table reports the test results for the relation between a general counsel in top management using general 
counsel fixed effects. The test sample is the set of firm-year observations for firms that have at least one general 
counsel observed in multiple firms. This sample includes observations for these firms in the years in which they 
have other general counsels that we do not observe in multiple firms. Panel A presents the results including firm 
and general counsel fixed effects, Panel B presents the results including firm, CEO and general counsel fixed 
effects, and Panel C presents the results including firm, CEO, CFO and general counsel fixed effects. The 
detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is multiplied by -1 so that all measures of 
tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 








General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance when the General Counsel has Tax or 
other Expertise 
Panel A: GC's Tax Expertise 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 4,547   4,143   5,401   3,364 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1528   0.7853   0.7686   0.3763 
Panel B: GC's Tax, Accounting or Finance Expertise 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 4,547   4,143   5,401   3,364 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1531   0.7857   0.7688   0.3763 
Panel C: GC's Experience in Top Management 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 























































       Observations 4,728   4,220   5,604   3,479 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1544   0.7841   0.7689   0.3767 
This table reports the regression results for the relation between a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance when the general counsel has tax or other expertise. Panel A presents the results when the general 
counsel has tax expertise, Panel B presents the results when the general counsel has tax, accounting or finance 
expertise, and Panel C presents the results when the general counsel has years of experience in top management. 
The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is multiplied by -1 so that all 
measures of tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients, and are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels or better, respectively (one-tailed test where 




General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance when the Auditor is a Tax Expert 
Panel A: Auditor Tax Expertise 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 2,845   3,173   3,385   2,092 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1447   0.7895   0.7754   0.3877 
Panel B: Auditor Audit and Tax Expertise 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 2,845   3,173   3,385   2,092 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1447   0.7890   0.7755   0.3875 
Panel C: Auditor Tax Fees Importance 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 2,840   3,168   3,379   2,092 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1453   0.7890   0.7737   0.3873 
This table reports the regression results for the relation between a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance when the auditor is a tax expert. Panel A presents the results when the auditor is a tax expert, Panel B 
presents the results when the auditor is both an audit and tax expert, and Panel C presents the results as a 
function of tax fees paid to the auditor. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. 
ETR is multiplied by -1 so that all measures of tax avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax 
avoidance. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients, and are adjusted 
for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels or better, 




General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance when CEO is Powerful 
Panel A: CEO's Relative Compensation to the GC 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 4,282   3,978   5,068   3,049 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1515   0.7885   0.7718   0.3801 
Panel B: CEO's Pay Slice 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 4,733   4,224   5,609   3,483 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1531   0.7842   0.7682   0.3775 
Panel C: GC Becomes Part of Top Management after the CEO is appointed 
  ETR   PRED_UTB   SHELTER   NTAXHAVEN 




















































       Observations 2,423   2,315   2,934   1,862 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.1426   0.7765   0.7761   0.3767 
This table reports the regression results for the relation between a general counsel in top management and tax 
avoidance when the CEO is powerful. Panel A presents the results using CEO’s relative compensation to the 
general counsel as a proxy for CEO power, Panel B presents the results using CEO’s pay slice as a proxy for 
CEO power, and Panel C presents the results based on whether the general counsel becomes part of top 
management in the first year that the current CEO is appointed as a proxy for CEO power. The detailed 
definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. ETR is multiplied by -1 so that all measures of tax 
avoidance tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the regression coefficients, and are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a 
prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
